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MAKING LAWYERS GOOD PEOPLE:
POSSIBILITY OR PIPEDREAM?
Subha Dhanaraj*
Law schools are like medieval monasteries. We seclude our nov-
ices from the world, give them sacred texts .... We give them
ritual incantations ... to perform when their faith flags. Unlike
other monasteries, however, we have no holy songs, for our faith
holds that everything significant can be said. Our students take
the vow to think like lawyers. As if in perpetual meditation, they
must exclude from consciousness their prior lives and thoughts,
their opinions, their outrage. We provide no spiritual room for
their doubts. If they continue to have them, they will simply
fail-in law school, and in the profession. There is no way to
impart the calling to those who are not blessed. The exam will tell
whether the incantations are working or whether they are tainted
by doubt.'
INTRODUCTION
"OOOhhh! It's perfect!" Sara said to the real estate agent. Sara
and Mike had been scrounging for years to save enough money for
the down payment on a home, and had finally found their dream
house. Their enthusiasm for the beautiful Victorian cottage did not
prevent them from having an engineer inspect the house and their
attorney handle the closing and the other legal matters. The house
seemed sturdy and fine. When Sara and Mike met with the seller's
attorney, she handed them a report indicating that the house was
pest free. Within a month, Sara and Mike move in.
Within a few weeks, perhaps even days, Sara and Mike discover
that everything is not quite perfect in their new home. Mice ap-
pear everywhere. They eat the couple's food and destroy personal
belongings. Their filth pervades everything. To make matters
worse, Sara has severe allergies and cannot stop sneezing whenever
* J.D. Candidate, 2002, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 1997, Cornell
University. The author would like to thank Professor Russell Pearce for his constant
support, encouragement, and editorial supervision. This Comment is dedicated to my
parents, Shyamala Dhanaraj and Dhanaraj Kabali, for instilling in me the ability to
think critically and to act morally. Without their guidance, courage, love, and sup-
port, all the achievements of the author's life never would have been possible.
1. Karl Johnson & Ann Scales, An Absolutely, Positively True Story: Seven Rea-
sons Why We Sing, 16 N.M. L. REV. 433, 438-39 (1986).
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the mice are near. In fact, her quality of life worsens to the point
that Sara and Mike decide to move out. Angry, sad, and vengeful,
they decide to take action against the seller's attorney for provid-
ing them with an inaccurate report, only to find out that they have
no recourse.
In the adversarial world of today's legal system, the seller's attor-
ney in the aforementioned situation can offer a simple apology for
the tragic situation and walk away. What makes the attorney able
to walk away without fear or moral trepidation?2 Surely that is not
a natural human reaction. Where is it learned? Why is it taught?
Where has the lawyer's morality gone? 3
Today's lawyers seem nonchalant about their clients, their cli-
ents' problems, and the ethical situations in which they find them-
selves.4 Attorneys appear to practice in a universe in which
morality and compassion are not considerations. Lawyers seem to
have distanced themselves entirely from moral responsibility.5
Without moral responsibility, social accountability cannot exist.
Without social accountability, achieving and maintaining a truly
just society is nearly impossible.
Some scholars argue that the lawyer's lack of ethical accountabil-
ity stems from an inherent failure in the methodology of legal edu-
cation6 and, perhaps, from a failure of the profession itself.7
2. "[E]ach fall [Harvard Law School] takes five hundred of our brightest, most
idealistic young people and in three years transforms them into Wall Street
moneygrubbers." Calvin Trillin, A Reporter at Large: Harvard Law School, THE NEW
YORKER, Mar. 26, 1984, at 53.
3. As Chief Justice Earl Warren noted, "Throughout history, and never more
than in our own day, the great question has been whether law was to be compatible
with the basic instinct of all human beings for freedom, for opportunity, for dignity
and for peace." Earl Warren, Remarks at the unveiling of the cornerstone at Fordham
University School of Law, in A.B.A. INT'L & COMP. L.B., July 1960, at 36.
4. Paul J. Zwier & Ann B. Hamric, The Ethics of Care and Reimagining the Law-
yer/Client Relationship, 22 J. CONTEMP. L. 383, 383 (1996) (noting the alienation of
clients from their attorneys and the general lack of human concern lawyers seem to
have for individuals they represent). Zwier and Hamric note how lawyers are taught
and encouraged through traditional legal education to perceive all problems in terms
of legal issues without taking into account the non-legal interests of clients. Id. at 391-
92. For example, if a young man retains a lawyer to have his elderly father committed
to a nursing home against his will, the young man is the lawyer's client and the lawyer
will review the issue from the perspective of the young man, failing to consider the
more comprehensive and more important human relationships at stake. Id. at 391-92.
5. Walter H. Bennett Jr., Making Moral Lawyers: A Modest Proposal, 36 CATH.
U. L. REV., 45, 46 (1986).
6. See e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, Ethics by the Pervasive Method, 42 J. LEG. EDU.
31 (1994) (discussing the general apathy on the part of legal educators and law schools
with regard to taking an active role in making ethics and professional responsibility a
central part of the academic curriculum).
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Admittedly, law school prepares students to understand the intrica-
cies of legal issues by grounding students in the bedrock of substan-
tive law, but, in so doing, forces lawyers to separate their souls
from their profession. Society should expect lawyers to be more
morally responsible than most non-lawyers because of the way in
which lawyers can impact clients, other legal parties in a lawsuit,
and even the general public. Law schools, however, fail to achieve
this goal.8 This Comment examines the failings of the current sys-
tem of legal education to inculcate future lawyers with a height-
ened sense of moral responsibility.9 Although some studies suggest
immutable personality traits contribute to one's success as a law-
yer,10 "[t]he best empirical data indicates [sic] that an individual's
moral development can and does continue during the years when
most people attend law school."11 Whether or not this notion is
true, law schools have a duty to morally educate their students be-
cause of the critical situations lawyers regularly find themselves in.
Lawyers work with confidential information in time-sensitive situa-
tions that can affect the judicial system, the general public, and the
lives of legal parties. Thus, lawyers need to function with a great
sense of moral imperative.
Lawyers handle delicate information and have the potential to
make dramatic societal change, or, at the very least, affect the lives
of their clients. Instead, the behavior of practicing attorneys has
caused scorn and jocularity in mainstream society. The legal pro-
fession must maximize the ability of law students to grow morally,
7. Bennett, supra note 5, at 46; Richard K. Burke, Truth in Lawyering: An Essay
on Lying and Deceit in the Practice of Law, 38 ARK. L. REV. 1 (1984).
8. Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the
Legal Profession, 91 MIcH. L. REV. 34, 38 (1992) (noting that law schools have an
important responsibility to produce ethical lawyers); Rhode, supra note 6, at 43; see,
e.g., Teaching Legal Ethics: A Symposium, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1 (1991); Richard Was-
serstrom, Legal Education and the Good Lawyer, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 155 (1984).
9. Perhaps, as Professor Robert A. Solomon muses:
Students do come to law school filled with passion, with morality, with a
sense of justice, and we spend, the generic we, the law school itself, spends
three years doing our best to crush them under the weight of the rule of law
instead of helping them to integrate their ideas and values with the law.
Robert A. Solomon, The Justice Mission of American Law Schools, 40 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 507, 508 (1992).
10. Susan Daicoff, Lawyer, Know Thyself- A Review of Empirical Research on At-
torney Attributes Bearing on Professionalism, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1337, 1352-54 (1997)
(evaluating empirical studies indicating certain traits to be linked to success in the
legal profession).
11. Bennett, supra note 5, at 52.
20392001]
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL[Vol. XXVIII
not only to produce more ethical lawyers, but also to improve the
diminished prestige of the legal profession. 12
Part I of this Comment outlines general conceptions of morality
and moral development according to the widely accepted model
promulgated by Professor Lawrence Kohlberg, and enunciates the
importance of moral theory in the context of legal education. Part
II analyzes competing views of moral development and challenges
some general concerns about the value of moral education in law
schools. Part III proposes the incorporation of moral teaching in
the law school curriculum to remedy the disjunction between per-
sonal convictions and legal analysis stemming from the Langdellian
method of legal training. 13 Part IV discusses the challenges to in-
corporating moral education into legal training. Finally, this Com-
ment concludes that moral education is critical to producing
compassionate, concerned legal professionals.
I. CONCEPTIONS OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT
When speaking of morality, scholars often describe man's moral
spectrum as a dynamic equilibrium between opposing moral
forces.14 That is, two diametrically opposing ways of thinking
about morality are in constant tension with each other,'5 namely
"morality from above" and "morality from below.' 1 6 Morality
from above comes from within. 7 Because morality from above
comes from the individual, he or she will be more apt to behave in
accordance with such ethical thinking.18 Professor Lon Fuller, as
12. Scholars generally agree that the public perception of lawyers is an increas-
ingly negative one. Daicoff, supra note 10, at 1344; Gary A. Hengstler, Vox Populi:
The Public Perception of Lawyers: ABA Poll, 79 A.B.A. J. 60 (1993).
13. The Langdellian method, introduced by Harvard Law Professor Professor
Christopher Langdell in 1870, implements the use of scientific methodology in the
teaching of law. Kurt M. Saunders & Linda Levine, Learning to Think Like a Lawyer,
29 U. S. F. L. REV. 121, 128 (1994). In particular, Langdell reasoned that law students
could learn the patterns and doctrines of law through the analysis of appellate court
opinions. Id. The Langdellian method strives to wed "the teaching of legal doctrine
with the teaching of legal analysis." Id. at 129.
14. See generally A.D. LINDSAY, THE Two MORALITIES (1940); H.L.A. HART,
THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961); W.D. LAMONT, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORAL JUDG-
MENT (1946).
15. See generally HART, supra note 14; LAMONT, supra note 14; LINDSAY, supra
note 14.
16. Although scholars describe these differing forces of morality using varying
terms, the thrust of the argument centers on two human forces encouraging human
behavior-one from within and one from without.
17. LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 5 (1977).
18. Id.
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part of the William L. Storrs Lecture Series at Yale Law School in
1963, defined morality from above as the morality of aspiration.19
Morality of aspiration "is the morality of the Good Life, of excel-
lence, of the fullest realization of human powers. '20 This morality
of aspiration is the achievement of one's potential. In terms of an
analysis based purely on the morality of aspiration, a morally rep-
rehensible man is one who fails "to realize his fullest capabilities"'
z
and is culpable, not for failing to meet his societal obligations, but
for failure to comport with "the conception of proper and fitting
conduct, conduct such as beseems a human being functioning at his
best."' 22 Morality from above is, thus, ethical behavior based on
personal motivations.
Morality from below, on the other hand, comes from without
and largely involves the standardization of individual behavior to
achieve societal norms.23 Such morality encourages obedience
largely through the use of communal incentives, like punishment
and mutual benefit.24 Morality from below, or the morality of
duty, as Professor Fuller describes it, focuses on maintaining order
within society.25 This conception of morality does not entail im-
provement, but mere maintenance of the existing social order.26
After setting specific objectives, a community based on the moral-
ity of duty promulgates rules and obligations to which all members
of society must comport.27 Failure to do so results in civil or crimi-
nal penalties. 28 Most criminal justice systems are the result of mo-
rality from below. For example, society, as a whole determines a
particular individual behavior, such as stealing, to be unacceptable.
Then, persons who steal face prosecution. Both morality from
above and morality from below discourage people from -stealing,
but in different ways.
Extrapolating from these traditional conceptions of morality,
Jean Piaget, an eminent child psychologist, revolutionized the field
of moral theory by presenting a developmental theory of morality
stemming from the cognitive processes that take place as individu-
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. See id. at 5-6.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 5.
26. See id. at 5-6.
27. Id.; see, e.g., LINDSAY, supra note 14.
28. See e.g., HART, supra note 14.
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als grow. 29 Piaget examined changes in thinking in relation to age
and dealings with other people, ideas, and surroundings.3 ° Piaget
showed that, as children age and interact in different ways with
their environment, they learn to use logic differently.31 With the
continuing desire to reconcile their personal perceptions with new
information gained through experiences with the people, ideas, and
objects in their environment, children often have to modify their
own perceptions, without necessarily surrendering them as incom-
patible with objective reality. 2 For example, Piaget notes:
The average seven-year-old looks at the sun and understands
more about it than does the average four-year old. At seven,
the child knows about the sun's relative size and distance from
the earth, but he also logically relates these discrete data in or-
der to judge that the sun is larger than the earth. Even if the
average four-year-old were taught this information, he would
not be able to apply it, for he has not yet developed the cogni-
tive capacity to understand why the logical principle of perspec-
tive makes sense. To understand a logical principle properly, we
must have developed it as part of our capacity to make sense of
the world in which we live.33
Thus, as individuals relate to their environment, their view of phe-
nomena and ideas change, in accordance with their subjective per-
ception of these experiences.34 Higher logical thinking comes from
interaction with the environment.35 Cognitive experience leads to
knowledge.36
Piaget expounded upon his developmental theory to formulate a
ready analogy in the context of moral development. 37 He theo-
rized that individuals grow in moral reasoning skills as they interact
with ideas and notions present in their environment. 38 When ex-
posed to new ideas, individuals must react to this change in infor-
mation.39 Piaget reasoned that individuals, when they encounter
29. JOSEPH REIMER ET AL., PROMOTING MORAL GROWTH 18 (1979).
30. Id. at 18-20.
31. Id. at 19-20.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 2 (describing Piaget's clinical analysis of children at various stages in
developmental growth) (emphasis added).
34. Id. at 19-20.
35. Id.
36. See id.
37. Id. at 21.
38. Id. at 20-21.
39. Id.
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stimuli through cognitive experience, could either assimilate or ac-
commodate this information.4 °
"Assimilation" refers to an incorporation of new information
and/or experience without an accompanying shift in morality or
philosophy.41 Assimilation is the mere recognition of difference
without any corresponding change in one's perception of the
world. 42 "Accommodation," on the other hand, focuses on an in-
ability for the new information or experience to coexist contempo-
raneously with the ideology and moral philosophy of the
individual 43 and the resulting transformation of the individual's
moral principles to end cognitive dissonance.44 By its very name,
accommodation connotes change. 45 Reconciliation between sub-
jective perceptions and objective information in the environment
necessarily follows when the perception and phenomena or experi-
ence differ substantially.46
In relating these ideas to moral development, Piaget found a
gradual progression in moral reasoning generally proportional to
the age of the children involved in his clinical analysis.47 As indi-
viduals grow and gather new data from their surroundings, this new
information needs to fit into the individual's schemata of the world.
Such growth takes place in all facets of thinking, including moral-
ity. Although Piaget's findings were significant, he explored moral
development theory in a limited fashion. Piaget did not extend his
clinical studies to children more than twelve years old.48 Children
over twelve and even adults continue to absorb information
40. Id.
41. Id. at 21-23.
42. Id. at 22.
43. Id. at 22-23. The authors provide an interesting example contrasting assimila-
tion and accommodation. Id. They present a hypothetical involving a college fresh-
man raised in an extremely conservative home. Id. Upon arriving at college, the
freshman becomes increasingly concerned as he discovers other ways of looking at the
world. Id. If he can reconcile these new-found liberal views while still maintaining his
overall conservative philosophy, he has assimilated the information. Id. If, upon re-
flection, the college freshman no longer considers himself to be conservative, he has
accommodated the ideas to which he has been exposed. Id.
44. Id.
45. To accommodate is to "make consistent with, adapt to... become accustomed
or acclimatized to, get used to." THE OXFORD DESK DICTIONARY AND THESAURAUS
5 (Am. ed. 1997).
46. REIMER ET AL., supra note 29, at 20-23.
47. Id. at 40-42 (describing Piaget's clinical analysis of children at various stages in
developmental growth).
48. Id.
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through cognitive processes relevant to moral development.49
Moreover, Piaget also did not complete delineating the intricacies
of his moral development theory.5" He did, however, stimulate
thinking about moral reasoning in relation to development.
Building upon Piaget's work, the late Lawrence Kohlberg, Pro-
fessor of Education and Social Psychology at the Harvard Gradu-
ate School of Education, formulated the cognitive-developmental
theory of moralization. 51 Kohlberg examined the role cognitive
processes play in changes in moral reasoning.52 He crystallized the
application of staged development to moral reasoning.5 3 Kohlberg
studied trends in moral reasoning and related these trends to cog-
nitive development. 54  Using Piaget's cognitive development
model, he performed his own clinical analyses 55 and categorized
moral reasoning into six hierarchical stages within three major
levels. Kohlberg noticed that moral reasoning increased with age,
but age was not a clearly dispositive variable in determining moral
behavior.56 Kohlberg recognized that moral reasoning changed as
individuals interacted with their environment through traditional
cognitive processes.57
Kohlberg's six-stage model describes the general trends he found
in moral reasoning. The first level, the Preconventional level, con-
tains Stage I and Stage 11.58 Individuals who moralize on a Stage I
level avoid breaking rules for fear of punishment. 9 Their primary
reason for doing right is to avoid punishment.60 Such morality is
similar to basic "morality from below" reasoning.61 Stage II indi-
49. Individuals continue to have new experiences and exposure to new ideas as
they age. Id. at 45-46. For example, a woman with an unwanted pregnancy, who be-
lieves abortion is wrong, may look to friends, family, religion, and the law in deter-
mining whether or not to have an abortion. Id. Such a process naturally involves the
incorporation and examination of the woman's existing mode of thinking regarding
abortion. Id.
50. Id. at 40-42.
51. LAWRENCE KOHLBERG, Stages of Moral Development as a Basis for Moral Ed-
ucation, in MORAL EDUCATION 42 (1984).
52. REIMER ET AL., supra note 29, at 44-45.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. LAWRENCE KOHLBERG, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT 1
(1984).
56. LAWRENCE KOHLBERG, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT 172-83
(1984).
57. Id. at 170-72.
58. Id. at 172.
59. Id. at 174.
60. Id.
61. See supra pp. 2040-41.
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viduals tend to be more responsive to the needs of others in soci-
ety, but adhere to a "concrete individualistic perspective. '6 2 That
is, they behave so as to serve the interests of others, but only when
doing so is in their own immediate interest.63 Stage II individuals
view the world in pure market exchange terms. 4 They see moral
behavior as a bargain. A Stage II person will act morally when
acting morally is of long or short-term individual benefit.65
Stages III and IV fall within the Conventional Level.66 Stage III
thinking involves a broader dimension of reasoning.6" Individuals
fitting within Stage III ethical thought focus on how others per-
ceive them and how they appear to others.68 As with image-con-
scious teens, one's peer group becomes central to one's analysis of
the environment and view of the world.69 The drive to do right
becomes equated with the drive to be liked. 0 Individuals act to
curry favor with those they know and whose opinions they value.7 1
Stage IV expands this peer-oriented perspective into one of socie-
tal order.7 2 The notions that individual behavior should uphold the
existing social order and that societal institutions exist to prevent
chaos and disorder drives Stage IV thinkers.73 In sum, just as Stage
III thinking relies on the desire to win approval from friends and
family, Stage IV reasoning centers on the perpetuation of society
as a whole.
The third level of Kohlberg's developmental model is the Princi-
pled level.74 The Principled, or Postconventional, level contains
the two highest methods of moral analysis. Stage V, called the
social contract or utility and individual rights stage, 76 motivates in-
dividuals to do right because of
a sense of obligation to law of one's social contract to make and
abide by laws for the welfare of all and for the protection of all
62. KOHLBERG, supra note 56, at 174.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 172-83.
65. Id. at 174.
66. Id. at 172.
67. Id. at 174.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 175.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 172.
75. Id. at 172-73.
76. Id. at 175.
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people's rights. A feeling of contractual commitment, freely en-
tered upon, to family, friendship, trust, and work obligations.
Concern that laws and duties be based on rational calculation of
overall utility, "the greatest good for the greatest number."77
Persons at Stage V assume a macrocosmic view of morality.78 Con-
siderations of society as a whole in relation to individual liberties
become central.79 Questioning of the socio-legal order may result,
because the protection of individual rights and societal considera-
tions are not always identical or even analogous. 80
Individuals who subscribe to Stage VI, the stage of universal eth-
ical principles, follow larger principles of justice in the interests of
human rights and human dignity that may or may not transgress
man-made law.8' Doing right becomes a philosophical question.8 2
Stage VI thinkers question and will even disregard societal conven-
tions and personal convictions that do not correspond to universal
ethical principles like life, liberty, and equality.83
Although, at first glance, Kohlberg's description of moral devel-
opment may seem esoteric and too theoretical to have much practi-
cal purpose, this cognitive development model of moralization is
an effective tool for increasing levels of moral reasoning in individ-
uals, as has been demonstrated by countless clinical studies.84
Moshe Blatt, a pioneer in the field of moral education based on
the Kohlberg developmental model, suggests an artificial mecha-
nism to spark the cognitive processes necessary for moral growth.85
He hypothesized that the systematic exposure of individuals to a
stage of moral reasoning exactly one stage above their own would
stimulate individuals into reasoning at the higher stage.8 6 By so
doing, Blatt hoped individuals would adopt the higher stage of
moral reasoning, in a manner similar to that described by Piaget in
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 182-83.
82. Id. at 176-78.
83. Id. at 176.
84. Such studies include the clinical analyses described in M.W. Berkowitz et al.,
The Relation of Moral Judgment Stage Disparity to Developmental Effects of Peer Dia-
logues, 26 MERRILL PALMER Q. 341-57 (1980); A. Lockwood, The Effects of Values
Clarification and Moral Development Curricula in School-Age Subjects: A Critical Re-
view of Recent Research, 48 REV. OF EDUC. RES. 325-64 (1978); A. Schlafli et al., Does
Moral Education Improve Moral Judgment?, 55 REV. OF EDuc. RES. 319-52 (1985).
85. F. CLARK POWER ET AL., LAWRENCE KOHLBERG'S APPROACH TO MORAL ED-
UCATION 11 (1991).
86. Id.
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his discussion of assimilation or accommodation of differing moral
precepts.87 If natural exposure to new ideas in one's environment
can spark moral growth, a managed, carefully constructed artificial
exposure, Blatt argued, could do the same.88
In order to demonstrate his hypothesis, Blatt worked with a class
of sixth grade students. 89 He began by testing their moral stage to
obtain an initial assessment. 90 Blatt presented a moral dilemma to
the students on a weekly basis and asked the group to discuss solu-
tions and explain which solutions were best. 91 In conjunction with
this discussion, Blatt would then expound upon the resolution pro-
posed by the student with the highest level of moral reasoning or
clarify and support an argument exactly one developmental stage
above that of the majority of the children.92 When twelve weeks
had passed, Blatt tested the children again and learned that sixty-
four percent of the children had advanced one full stage in moral
reasoning. 93 This change was not transient. Most of the children
remained at the higher stage of moral reasoning when they were
tested one year after the completion of Blatt's initial work with
them.94
Moreover, the moral reasoning developed by these students was
universally applicable. 95 The students not only reasoned at the
higher stage when facing dilemmas to those problems brought up
in class, but also when confronting other ethically problematic is-
sues. 96 Many researchers have replicated Blatt's work with analo-
gous results. 97 These studies generally indicate that long-term
moral education is possible and that such education is most effec-
tive when individuals are gradually taught at exactly one stage
above their own.98 The works of Piaget, Kohlberg, Blatt and their
successors thus provide, not only a structured theoretical analysis
87. See generally Part I.
88. POWER ET AL., supra note 85, at 11.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 12.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 13; Berkowitz et al., supra note 84, at 341-57; Lockwood, supra note 84,
at 325-64; SchliAfli et al., supra note 84, at 319-52.
98. L.J. Walker, Sources of Conflict for Stage Transition in Moral Development, 19
DEV. PSYCHOL. 103-10 (1983).
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of moral development, but also a concrete and successful method
for morally educating individuals.
Kohlberg's cognitive development model of moralization has sig-
nificance for the legal profession. Practicing attorneys generally
follow Conventional Stage IV morality to a much greater degree
than the general population.99 The primary focus of most lawyers
is on the perpetuation of current ways of thinking about law and
society. Not only do attorneys maintain the current socio-legal or-
der, but they also represent this system.100 The Stage IV moral ori-
entation of most attorneys suggests that lawyers rely heavily on
rules and the maintenance of the socio-legal order, with little re-
gard for their personal convictions and universal ethical
principles. 10 1
Stage IV morality is the morality of society's status quo, and in-
volves minimal concern for individual values or macrocosmic per-
ceptions of morality beyond conventional societal norms.0 2
Professor Steven Hartwell of the University of San Diego Law
School noted such Stage IV morality to be the belief that law has a
moral basis that must be maintained.10 3 Under a Stage IV analysis,
lawyers act in accordance with socio-legal rules without any per-
sonal reflection. 4 Stage V, Hartwell notes, is the morality of civil
disobedience and accommodates the conflict between legal princi-
ples and personal morality. 05 Stage V morality in a legal setting is
99. Lawrence J. Landwehr, Lawyers as Social Progressives or Reactionaries: The
Law and Order Cognitive Orientation of Lawyers, 7 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 39, 39-42
(1982) (finding that 90.3% of lawyers function at a Stage IV level, 2.5% at Stage V,
and 7.2% at Stage III); June Louin Tapp & Felicia J. Levine, Legal Socialization:
Strategies for an Ethical Legality, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1, 22 n.86 (1974) (generally af-
firming Landwehr's findings).
100. Daicoff, supra note 10, at 1411 (stating that lawyers' "tendency towards con-
ventional, Stage IV ... moral reasoning may well appear odd, rigid, and even amoral
to a public . . . who reason[s] at Kohlberg's Stages III, IV, and V (including post-
conventional reasoning)").
101. Id. at 1396.
102. Id.
103. See Lisa G. Lerman, Teaching Moral Perception and Moral Judgment in Legal
Ethics Courses: A Dialogue About Goals, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 457,464-65 (1998)
(quoting Steven Hartwell, Promoting Moral Development Through Experiential
Teaching, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 505 (1995)). In addition to describing the behavior of
attorneys using a Stage IV and Stage V analysis, Professor Hartwell also detailed the
behavior of attorneys who reason using Stage III. He noted that such attorneys prac-
tice "Watergate morality." Id.
104. Id. at 465-66 (wondering if there can be "a merger between personal morality
and lawyer morality" and noting that one of the goals in "teaching ethics is to advance
students' moral development by teaching ethics in the context of lawyering
experience").
105. Id.
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the recognition that conventional law and the application of the
legal system may not always be truly ethical or comport to personal
morality. 10 6 When personal morality differs from the law or the
legal system, the Stage V lawyer questions, reflects, and responds,
in an effort to change the law and society. 10 7 If attorneys do not
subscribe to any Stage V moral analysis, they will not incorporate
moral conviction into their practice. 08 Social change and activist
lawyering will therefore suffer.' 0 9
Furthermore, studies show that the higher the cognitive develop-
mental moral stage at which an individual reasons, the more consis-
tent will be the individual's behavior." 0 That is, if an attorney
reasons at Stage V, he or she will behave more consistently."' For
example, two individuals, one reasoning at Stage III and the other
at Stage V, may both agree that stealing is wrong. The Stage V
person, however, will almost never steal because of his or her uni-
versal ethical principles, while the Stage III individual's behavior
will be more difficult to predict. An individual at Stage III may
steal, if doing so might make his family, friends, and peer group
like him more.
106. See Richard A. Matasar, The Pain of Moral Lawyering, 75 IOWA L. REV. 975,
976 (1990) (recognizing that "[i]t is the rare lawyer who cannot say with great cer-
tainty that he or she has often believed a client's position to be wrong, though argua-
bly acceptable. It is the lawyer's odd lot to argue simultaneously the correctness of
matters he or she subjectively believes to be incorrect").
107. Michael Daneker, Moral Reasoning and the Quest for Legitimacy, 43 AM. U.
L. REV. 49, 64-65 (1993) (arguing that the Supreme Court should, at times, use
Kohlberg Stage V reasoning to revise law for the benefit of society).
108. Matasar, supra note 106, at 975. Matasar admits:
I didn't like some of the things I did as a lawyer. I took positions I didn't
believe in. I made arguments that I thought bordered on untrue. I postured.
I bluffed. I pursued advantages provided more by clients' resources than the
value of their claims. And, I found out that doing the things that lawyers
do-ethical things!-can be painful. The problem is, I didn't learn this les-
son until I became a lawyer.
Id.
109. W. Bradley Wendel, Lawyers and Butlers: The Remains of Amoral Ethics, 9
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 161, 180 (1995) (noting that "lawyers may be psychologically
reluctant to follow the imperatives of private morality, believing that their role in the
legal system somehow compels them to follow legal norms").
110. See, e.g., Richard A. Tsujimoto & Kathy A. Emmons, Predicting Moral Con-
duct: Kohlberg's and Hogan's Theories, 115 J. PSYCHOL. 241, 241 (1983). Tsujimoto
and Emmons tested forty nine college students to determine their Kohlberg moral
judgment stage in order to predict whether these students would volunteer to work
for a charity and whether they would actually show up to work for it.
111. JAMES R. REST, DEVELOPMENT IN JUDGING MORAL ISSUES (1979); Augusto
Blasi, Bridging Moral Cognition and Moral Action: A Critical Review of the Literature,
88 PSYCHOL. BULL. 1 (1980).
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Despite the general acceptance of Kohlberg's cognitive develop-
ment model of moralization and its foundational underpinnings,
critics and commentators have noted the predominant use of male
behavior and perceptions in establishing norms in moral reason-
ing.112 Beginning in the 1970s, critics of traditional moral develop-
mental models began focusing on gender differences in the moral
reasoning of males and females." 3 One of the most influential the-
orists to attack Kohlberg, Carol Gilligan, posited that men and wo-
men place different weights on factors influencing moral decision-
making.1 14 She then related these variations to the diverging views
of self and human interactions between men and women.1 1 5 Spe-
cifically, Gilligan noted that men view the world with a hierarchi-
cal, rights perspective-a perspective that recognizes differing
rights among individuals and that places varying value on those
112. CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND
WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT 2 (1982); MAPPING THE MORAL DOMAIN: A CONTRIBU-
TION OF WOMEN'S THINKING TO PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND EDUCATION (Carol
Gilligan et al. eds., 1988). But cf. SIGMUND FREUD, Some Psychological Consequences
of the Anatomical Distinction Between the Sexes and Female Sexuality, reprinted in
SIGMUND FREUD, SEXUALITY AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LOVE 183-211 (P. Reiff ed.,
1963) (1925) (remarking that women are guided by feelings, whereas men rely on a
sense of justice and right and wrong).
Piaget also branded women to be morally deficient in relation to men. In studying
male and female children at play, Piaget noted that girls focused on the preservation
of relationships and harmony, but boys worked through and resolved disputes. JEAN
PIAGET, THE MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD 13-108 (Marjorie Cabain trans.,
1965).
113. NANCY CHODORow, THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING 167 (1978); Norma
Haan, Two Moralities in Action Contexts: Relationships to Thought, Ego Regulation,
and Development, 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 286 (1978); Constance
Boucher Holstein, Irreversible, Stepwise Sequence in the Development of Moral Judg-
ment: A Longitudinal Study of Males and Females, 47 CHILD DEV. 51 (1976).
114. GILLIGAN, supra note 112, at 2-3; Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Wo-
men's Conceptions of Self and Of Morality, 47 HARV. EDUC. REV. 481, 481-83 (1982).
115. GILLIGAN, supra note 112, at 2-3. Gilligan develops her discussion of morality
and gender differences from the paradigmatic Heinz dilemma. In the Heinz dilemma,
Heinz's wife will die if she does not receive a particular medication that he cannot
afford to buy. The moral quandary is whether or not he should steal the drug. In a
study on adolescent moral development, the eleven year-old female participant
looked to alternatives besides stealing, including getting a loan or discussing the prob-
lem with the pharmacist, while the eleven year-old male participant advocated theft of
the drug, since human life is of immeasurable value. Applying a traditional Kohlberg
analysis, the girl reasoned at Stage III, while the boy applied a Stage IV analysis.
GILLIGAN, supra note 112, at 5-30; see also Gilligan, supra note 114, at 481-83. Carol
Gilligan theorized that men have a distinct sense of self, separate from others, thus
leading them to reason on a foundation of rules and rights. Women, on the other
hand, view themselves as part of a web of relationships and recognize that what im-
pacts one relationship affects the entire connected nexus of relationships. Id.
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rights.116 Women, instead, examine ethical conflict situations
through a contextual lens, placing value on the continuance and
maintenance of the relationships forming the situation, as opposed
to any hierarchical evaluation of the respective rights of the parties
involved"'7
Gilligan devised three stages to categorize thinking from a care
perspective. In the first stage, an individual's only concern is her-
self. 118 Moral reasoning centers on an individual's needs and
goals. 1 9 The second stage, on the other hand, equates moral good
with caring for others and selflessness, perhaps to the detriment of
the self.120 The third stage is, in effect, an amalgamation of the first
two stages, that is, the recognition that caring for others is impor-
tant, but that such care necessarily includes caring for oneself.1 2 '
Thus, Gilligan's three-stage model differs from Kohlberg's more
punctuated stratification of hierarchical principles. Interestingly,
later empirical studies suggest that males and females do not differ
in terms of Kohlberg's moral development stages, 22 but do disa-
gree considerably on the expression of that moral perspective. 23
The varying ways in which men and women express this morality
demonstrate the potential of law school to influence an individual's
moral reasoning skills. Although individuals generally adhere to a
rights or care perspective, the completion of one year of law school
produces a dramatic change; the rights perspective largely replaces
the care perspective. 124 Legal education promotes masculine struc-
116. Nina J. Crimm, A Study: Law School Students' Moral Perspectives in the Con-
text of Advocacy and Decision-Making Roles, 29 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1, 18 (1994).
117. Id.
118. GILLIGAN, supra note 112, at 74-79.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 79-82.
122. Muriel J. Bebeau & Mary M. Brabeck, Integrating Care and Justice Issues in
Professional Moral Education: A Gender Perspective, 16 J. MORAL EDUC. 189, 191
(1987) (citing studies that show gender differences to cause only trace differences in
moral reasoning).
123. John C. Gibbs et al., Sex Differences in the Expression of Moral Judgment, 55
CHILD DEV. 1040-43 (1984).
124. Janet Taber et al., Gender, Legal Education, and the Legal Profession: An Em-
pirical Study of Stanford Law Students and Graduates, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1209, 1250
(1988). Taber learned that women focus on relationships and communication, but
noted that women adhered to legal precedent to the same extent as men. Id. She
rationalized that the "socialization of legal training may have led women to respond
in the traditional manner to legal precedent." Id. See also Sandra Janoff, The Influ-
ence of Legal Education on Moral Reasoning, 76 MINN. L. REV. 193, 217-29 (1991).
Janoff concluded that the first year of law school had a dramatic impact on the moral
reasoning of female students. Specifically, after one year at law school, the female
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tures of thought and the consideration of the hierarchy of rights. 25
This emphasis on the rights orientation seems to be pervasive, as
demonstrated by Professor Michael Daneker, who studied the use
of moral reasoning in judicial methodology, in his analysis of moral
reasoning in judicial decision-making. 126
In particular, Daneker focuses on DeShaney v. Winnebago De-
partment of Social Services, 27 noting the United States Supreme
Court had the opportunity to assume a strong care and connection
approach, but failed to do so, instead relying on a traditional rights
orientation. 128 In DeShaney, a mother sued the Winnebago De-
partment of Social Services for returning her son home to his bio-
students had adopted the rights-oriented perspective of the greater number of their
male colleagues. She also discovered that all students, regardless of gender, became
much more situated in a rights perspective in analyzing moral dilemmas. Id.; Crimm,
supra note 116, at 24. Crimm presented seventy second-year law school students with
a moral dilemma as part of an essay examination in required course on federal taxa-
tion course. Id. Of the seventy students, divided about equally in gender, all of the
responses came from a rights perspective. Id. Only five students included a trace of
the ethics of care perspective. Id. For further discussion, see Michael Burns, The Law
School as a Model for Community, 10 NOVA L. J. 329, 332 (1986); Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, Feminist Legal Theory, Critical Legal Studies, and Legal Education or "The
Fem-Crits Go to Law School," 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 61, 67-68 (1988).
125. K.C. Worden, Note, Overshooting the Target: A Feminist Deconstruction of Le-
gal Education, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 1141, 1141-42 (1985) (discussing the demands of
legal education on the female mode of thinking and the necessity of conforming to
male attitudes and behavior to succeed in law school); see also Jane W. Coplin & John
E. Williams, Women Law Students' Descriptions of Self and the Ideal Lawyer, 2
PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 323, 329-31 (1978) (commenting that female law students saw
successful attorneys as being emotionally independent, competitive, quantifiably ob-
jective, and distancing).
126. See generally Daneker, supra note 107.
127. 489 U.S. 189 (1989). After several reports of child abuse, the Winnebago
County Department of Social Services took Joshua DeShaney into protective custody.
Id. at 189. The Department returned Joshua to his father after three days and ignored
subsequent reports of severe child abuse. Id. at 190. When Joshua's father beat him
so severely that the child sustained permanent brain damage, Joshua and his mother
sued Winnebago County for failure to protect. Id. at 189. The United States Supreme
Court determined that the state has no obligation to protect its citizens unless the
state had so constrained the individual as to prevent the individual from taking care of
himself. Id. at 199.
128. Daneker, supra note 107, at 60-65. Daneker compares the majority opinion to
the dissent by Justice Blackmun, in which Justice Blackmun assumes a strong care
approach. Id. "Poor Joshua!" Justice Blackmun laments, noting the web of relation-
ships formed by the County's awareness of the child abuse and its responsibility to
Joshua and his father. Id. at 63. Daneker notes the majority's reaction to be one of
Stage IV analysis-that is, the perception of due process as a static concept, one
which may only be interpreted in the same manner as past interpretations. Id. at 64;
see also Martha Minow, Words and the Door to the Land of Change: Law, Language,
and Family Violence, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1665, 1667-68 (1990) (criticizing the judicial
inaction by the Supreme Court in DeShaney).
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logical father despite the fact that substantiated evidence of abuse
had previously led the Department to remove Joshua DeShaney
from his father's custody.129
Using abstract rights and values in its analysis, the majority opin-
ion legitimized and reaffirmed static conceptions of due process as
a "normative principle distilled from prior cases. 1 30 Disavowing
its ability to transform existing law for the benefit of society, the
Supreme Court, instead, "sought maintenance of the social system
not because it was right or just, but simply because it already ex-
isted.' 13 1 Not only did the majority fail to use moral reasoning in
order to revise the law to further societal interests in protecting
children, but it relied on Stage IV reasoning in devising a view of
due process that stems from shared social norms, not universal
principles. 32 Even when a situation strongly indicates the use of
Stage V reasoning, that is, the consideration of broader, overarch-
ing principles of ethics, instead of the promulgation of existing so-
cial conceptions, lawyers remain reluctant to challenge societal
norms that may be of greater harm than good to the interests of
society.
II. MORALITY AND LEGAL EDUCATION
Current legal education techniques may, in fact, discourage stu-
dents from achieving any potential Stage V reasoning. Legal ed-
ucation relies on an extensive infrastructure of legal categories and
pigeonholing, which perpetuates this structural stratification. The
rigidity and formalistic nature of legal education potentially can
hinder personal progress to Stage V perceptions of broader ethical
principles and behavior promoting the good of all, particularly if
such behavior necessarily involves transforming the current socio-
legal order. 34
Instinctively realizing the effects of current legal education,
many practicing attorneys and academics criticize the law school
experience, recognizing that current legal training encourages
129. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
130. Daneker, supra note 107, at 65.
131. Id. at 65.
132. Id. at 64-65.
133. Janoff, supra note 117, at 194 n.3.
134. See Walter W. Steele Jr., A Comparison of Attitudes of Freshman and Senior
Law Students, 23 J. LEGAL EDUC. 318, 321 (1970) ("If substantial numbers of fresh-
man law students do, in fact, [as the empirical data suggest,] come to law school al-
ready equipped with lawyer-like attitudes and insights, then legal education might
make some adjustments to capitalize on this advantage.").
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alienation 135 and produces greed and cynicism 136 by engendering
the separation of the law student's sense of self into halves-one
half that analyzes the law in objective Langdellian fashion and the
other half that embodies his personal morality. 137 The current state
of law school education fails to prepare students "for the actual
rigors of practice and the ethical quandaries that await.' 138
Legal training readily accomplishes its goal of making law, by
definition societally determined,' 39 appear to be comprised of con-
crete calculations, much like the analytical sciences. n° In reality,
law is "that which is laid down. [It is] a rule or method according
to which phenomena or actions co-exist or follow each other. Law,
in its generic sense, is a body of rules of action or conduct pre-
scribed by controlling authority, and having binding legal force.' '1 41
Thus, law is not defined according to predetermined natural laws in
the same way as gravity or the intricacies of chemical bonding. 42
Instead, law necessarily involves morality and the exploration of
the reasons motivating the creation and application of a statute,
135. Ruta K. Stropus, Mend It, Bend It, and Extend It.- The Fate of Traditional Law
School Methodology in the 21st Century, 27 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 449 (1996) (commenting
on the manner in which the generally accepted Langdellian method stresses logic and
reason at the expense of personal values and moral conviction).
136. Michael E. Carney, Narcissistic Concerns in the Educational Experience of
Law Students, 18 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 9, 17 (1990); see also Paula A. Franzese, To Be
The Change: Finding Higher Ground in the Law, 50 ME. L. REV. 11, 14 (1998).
Franzese recognizes that:
The model of lawyer as statesperson -- as an individual of good, independent
judgment and practical wisdom, a peacemaker as well as a problem solver-
seems to have become the exception rather than the norm. Instead, today's
prototype in many respects is that of lawyer as hired gun, skilled technician
and/or business getter.
Id.
137. See, e.g., Stropus, supra note 135.
138. Franzese, supra note 136, at 19 ("Theoretically-as well as practically-ap-
plied considerations of right and wrong, of prudence and fairness, and of what the law
should be, must play a role in all course offerings [at law school], and must not be
relegated exclusivly to the domain of professional responsibility classes.").
139. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 612 (7th ed. 1991). Oliver Wendell Holmes once
defined the law as "the witness and external deposit of our moral life." Address by
Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law (Jan. 8, 1897), reprinted in OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 167 (1920).
140. Saunders & Levine, supra note 13, at 128-29.
141. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 612 (7th ed. 1991).
142. Even Judge Harry T. Edwards, who laments the theoretical bent of recent
legal scholarship and fears that students of legal theory "will not understand how to
practice as a professional" and "will be woefully unprepared for legal practice," ad-
mits the critical importance of legal ethics as a pervasive part of the law school curric-
ulum. Edwards, supra note 8, at 38.
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code, regulation, or case. 143 Nevertheless, as noted by Professor
Anthony Kronman in The Lost Lawyer, the legal profession stands
in peril of losing its soul. 14 4 Morality and the law are gradually
becoming mutually exclusive goals, as personal morality becomes
lost from legal practice and, more importantly, law school
education.
In large part, the traditional Langdellian method of legal educa-
tion, developed by Dean Christopher Columbus Langdell of
Harvard Law School, has caused the estrangement of morality
from legal practice.145 The Langdellian method aspires to make
law an objective science. In this method:
[L]aw was considered a science which was learned so that law-
yers could maintain the concept of order. Law was both the in-
strument and the expression of that order. The fundamental
concepts of right and wrong were not taught; law schools fo-
cused upon the more complex rules of moral order protected by
the law. 146
Combining this depiction with the previously mentioned definition
of law, law becomes the calculated behavior necessary to maintain
the moral rules determined by society. The law is thus virtually
synonymous with Stage IV moral reasoning as defined by
Kohlberg.
In DeShaney v. Winnebago Department of Social Services, in
constraining itself to conventional Stage IV morality, the Supreme
Court "used the intent of the Framers, unchanging constitutional
language, and precedent to create a vision of a shared social norm
of due process that could be applied simply to the facts before
it.'147 In so doing, the majority failed to recognize the relationship
143. Roger C. Cramton, The Ordinary Religion of the Law School Classroom, 29 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 247, 249 (1978).
144. ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 1 (1993).
145. James R. Elkins, Thinking Like a Lawyer: Second Thoughts, 47 MERCER L.
REV. 511, 522-23 (1996); Franzese, supra note 136, at 19 (acknowledging that tradi-
tional legal teaching separates the people and human problems from the abstract
principles within the cases); Fran Quigley, Seizing the Disorienting Moment: Adult
Learning Theory and the Teaching of Social Justice in Law School Clinics, 2 CLINICAL
L. REV. 37, 39 (1995).
146. James E. Moliterno, An Analysis of Ethics Teaching in Law Schools: Replacing
Lost Benefits of the Apprentice System in the Academic Atmosphere, 60 U. CIN. L.
REV. 83, 85 (1991) (arguing for greater emphasis on legal ethics education in light of
the replacement of the apprentice system by the typical three year law school
curriculum).
147. Daneker, supra note 107, at 65.
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between the government and its citizens.148 Instead, the Supreme
Court used Stage IV morality to maintain a social order that re-
flects the will of the majority, in spite of contravening universal
ethical principles suggesting a greater responsibility should be
borne by the state.149
The Langdellian method cares only for the analytical dimension
of legal education;15 personal values play no role.15 ' The Langdel-
lian model of legal instruction involves emotional detachment and
abstract scientific reasoning without consideration of personal val-
ues 152 in a largely Stage IV fashion. Even classes in legal ethics
cannot erase the rights orientation resulting from traditional legal
education. 53
Just as scientific determinations of acceleration or density no
longer involve moral conviction, the Langdellian case method
strives to base the study of case law on analogous scientific meth-
ods. 154  Also, as Dean Roger Cramton of Cornell Law School
noted, the continuous discussion of cases in the first year of law
school that involve situations in which both sides have good argu-
ments and either party could prevail leads to "value skepticism" in
law students.15 5 Values arguably appear to be equally worthy and
148. Id. at 65-66.
149. Id. at 66. Daneker does acknowledge, however, that Stage IV moral reasoning
in judicial decision-making may be the result of necessity. Id. In crafting a judicial
opinion, the judge writes for the legal community, a community that primarily em-
ploys Stage IV morality. Id. Stage IV reasoning would thus be the most effective way
to persuade attorneys to subscribe to the rationale of judicial decisions. Id. at 67-68.
150. Lorie M. Graham, Aristotle's Ethics and the Virtuous Lawyer: Part One of
Study on Legal Ethics and Clinical Legal Education, 20 J. LEGAL PROF. 5, 27 (1996);
Elkins, supra note 1, at 519.
151. Elkins, supra note 145, at 527 ("In the first year of law school, professors at-
tempt to make you believe cases and situations can be analyzed without regard to
your own or society's morals and ethics. After a while, students come to view cases in
this way: they learn to disregard their own feelings.").
152. Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education As Training for Hierarchy, in THE POLIT-
ICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 45 (David Kairys ed., 1990); Quigley, supra
note 145, at 39; see also Worden, supra note 125 (detailing the distancing of women
from their personal beliefs and emotions stemming from traditional legal education).
153. Thomas E. Willging & Thomas G. Dunn, The Moral Development of the Law
Student.- Theory and Data on Legal Education, 31 J. LEGAL EDUC. 306, 355 (1981)
(finding law students to remain at a Stage IV level of moral development upon com-
pletion of legal ethics); Tapp & Levine, supra note 99, at 25-26 (noting the over-
whelming tendency of law students to reason using Stage IV morality in ethical
conflict situations).
154. Solomon, supra note 9, at 508 (noting that legal educators need to teach stu-
dents how to integrate their feelings and morality with the law, instead of indoctrinat-
ing students to distinguish between the law and morality).
155. Cramton, supra note 143, at 254-55.
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society, through its judges, seemingly places arbitrary weight on
conflicting notions of what is proper behavior. This plethora of
borderline cases encourages the perception of moral relativism in
the law and stresses instability in the law.156 In such a society, in
which morals really do not matter, law students unsurprisingly be-
gin to devalue their own personal convictions. 157 Law students be-
gin to think of the legal system as a value-free forum in which
decision making has little, if any, moral implication. 158 Naturally,
this approach to learning leads to the divestment of individual be-
liefs from legal interactions.'5 9
Critics of legal education argue this separation between personal
values and professional practice is a necessary byproduct of profes-
sionalism. That is, a legal professional thinks in a manner neces-
sary to solve a legal problem, even when the issues involved are
unclear and contradictory.1 60 In fact, professionalism is the ability
156. Id. at 255; Elkins, supra note 145, at 521 (recognizing that "a tension appears
in the study of law as the student moves between poles (the poles themselves con-
stantly moving and shifting) of certainty and uncertainty").
157. Solomon, supra note 9, at 510. Solomon states:
I am shocked.., at how uncomfortable law students are at giving personal
opinions to a client. We [legal educators] teach students what to tell clients.
We teach students the law so that they can advise clients as best as possible.
We fail to teach students that they are allowed to say to a client, "You should
not do that. Although you are allowed legally to do that I think it is wrong!"
Id.
158. Cramton, supra note 143, at 255.
159. Some scholars argue that the separation of personal values from legal practice
is necessary. DAVID A. BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CEN-
TERED APPROACH 21 (1991) (telling lawyers and law students that "your advice
should generally be based on your understanding of the client's values. Giving advice
based on consequences you personally think important would impose your values on
a client and would be antithetical to client-centeredness"); see also Serena Stier, Legal
Ethics: The Integrity Thesis, 52 OHIO ST. L. J. 551, 555-56 (1991) (criticizing moral
activism in the legal profession). But see William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in
Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083, 1091 (1988) (arguing that lawyers have a respon-
sibility to use ethical discretion, even when such evaluation of personal values contra-
venes client goals). George Sharswood comments:
There is, perhaps, no profession, after that of the sacred ministry, in which a
high-toned morality is more imperatively necessary than that of the law ....
There are pitfalls and mantraps at every step, and the mere youth, at the
very outset of his career, needs often the prudence and self-denial, as well as
the moral courage, which belong commonly to riper years.
GEORGE SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 55 (1993); see also
Thomas L. Shaffer & Robert F. Cochran Jr., Lawyers as Strangers and Friends: A
Reply to Professor Sammons, 18 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 69 (1995) (discussing the
importance of moral counseling to legal practice).
160. Donald A. Schon, Educating the Reflective Legal Practitioner, 2 CLINICAL L.
REV. 231, 239 (1995).
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to find a solution amidst uncertainty and opposing ideas.6 Under
such a definition of legal professionalism, personal morality is irrel-
evant, as the ability to crystallize a solution to a legal problem is
not to look within oneself, but to apply traditional legal principles
and analysis to the facts of a situation to achieve a result that will
satisfy the client.
First described by Susan Price and David Binder in 1977, client-
centered lawyering focused more on the precise goals of a client
coupled with the treatment of the client as a collaborator in prob-
lem-solving, as opposed to a perception of the client as a person
needing the expert guidance of a legal professional. 162 The ratio-
nale for client-centered lawyering is that:
We have no special wisdom about what clients should want, and
each client has to live with the results of our work long after the
case has faded into the back of our memory. Clients are not
helpless, and even if they were, only rarely could we rescue
them .... [T]he client is a capable person who has hired us to
help the client accomplish a particular goal.1 63
Client-centered lawyering thus has the attorney focusing on how
best and most effectively to accomplish the client's desired results
without considering the attorney's own perspective on a given legal
problem. 64 Lawyering becomes acting as an agent of the client,
with the client's desires paramount. As an individual merely fulfil-
ling the wishes of her client, the attorney need not account for her
own morality in any substantive manner when engaging in the deci-
165sion-making process.
Unlike the traditional model of passive client and powerful pro-
fessional, client-centered lawyering focuses on the development of
viable solutions to legal questions that combine the client's non-
legal interests as well as his legal concerns. 66 In this participatory
161. Id. at 244.
162. BINDER ET AL., supra note 159, at 22 (referring to DAVID A. BINDER & SUSAN
M. PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING: A CLIENT-CENTERED AP-
PROACH (1977).
163. Id.
164. Id. at 21.
165. Of course, even if acting on behalf of a client and using the guiding principles
of client-centered lawyering, an attorney may not act as to violate her relevant state
ethics codes for lawyers.
166. BINDER ET AL., supra note 159, at 22-23 (1991). Binder, Bergman, and Price
argue that the participatory model of client-centered lawyering is better than the
traditional model of lawyering with passivity on the part of clients:
First, because lawyers are human, they make mistakes, and an actively in-
volved client will catch at least some of those mistakes before they cause
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model of legal analysis, the lawyer acknowledges that she needs the
client to address the legal issue and, in fact, recognizes the client as
necessary for "an added measure of creativity and an often supe-
rior knowledge of the facts." '167 Under a client-centered lawyering
model, the lawyer's primary relevant consideration is what the cli-
ent wants done. 68 The lawyer carries out the client's wishes and
advises the client regarding the likelihood of legal success. 169 Only
the opposing legal counsel and the judicial decision-making system
constrain the achievement of the client's goals.'
70
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct ("Model Rules")' 71 re-
inforce the goal of client participation in legal decision-making by
requiring lawyers to "abide by a client's decisions concerning the
objectives of representation" and to "consult with the client as to
the means by which they are to be pursued. ' 172 In so representing
the client, "[a] lawyer's representation of a client, including repre-
harm. Many clients can understand more of how to solve their problems
than some lawyers give them credit for, and most clients know at least as
much or even more about their own needs than a lawyer will .... Third,
"[t]he participatory model promotes the dignity of clients as citizens" be-
cause "it makes the client a doer, responsible for his choices." Fourth, it
reduces the client's anxiety because the client is not kept in the dark about
what is happening. Fifth, it protects "the integrity of professionals by liber-
ating them from . . .the burdens imposed [by a] paternal role" and from
client suspicion caused by client ignorance. And sixth, it "invites personal
contact in a society becoming increasingly impersonal."
Id. at 23 (citing DOUGLAS E. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO'S IN CHARGE?
168-70 (1974)).
167. Id.; see also DOUGLAS E. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO'S IN
CHARGE? (1974) (comparing the traditional and participatory models of lawyering
and determining that the participatory model results in better tangible rewards, that
is, larger jury awards, for clients in personal injury lawsuits).
168. Zwier & Hamric, supra note 4, at 392.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. The House of Delegates of the American Bar Association adopted the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct on August 2, 1983. The Model Rules recognize that
"lawyers play a vital role in the preservation of society. The fulfillment of this role
requires an understanding by lawyers of their relationship to our legal system. The
Rules of Professional Conduct, when properly applied, serve to define that relation-
ship." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Pmbl. (1983).
172. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (1983). Comment [1] to Rule
1.2 notes that:
Both lawyer and client have authority and responsibility in the objectives
and means of representation. The client has ultimate authority to determine
the purposes to be served by legal representation, within the limits imposed
by law and the lawyer's professional obligations. Within these limits, a client
also has the right to consult with the lawyer about the means to be used in
pursuing those objectives.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.1.2 cmt. 1 (1983).
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sentation by appointment, does not constitute an endorsement of
the client's political, economic, social or moral views or activi-
ties." '173 The Model Rules, therefore, support the rationale under-
lying client-centered lawyering, that is, the lawyer is distinct from
the client and acts merely on behalf of the client. Because the law-
yer acts as the direct representative of the client's wishes, the inde-
pendent morality of the lawyer has no tangible role in the
determination of the client's goals, as long as the achievement of
those objectives does not overtly transgress the pertinent profes-
sional codes.
Unlike the Model Rules, however, the American Bar Associa-
tion's Model Code of Professional Responsibility'74 ("Model
Code") acknowledges that, while the client's desires and objectives
are important, the lawyer may act in adherence with her own moral
values.'75 For example, Canon 7 of the Model Code ("A Lawyer
Should Represent a Client Zealously Within the Bounds of the
Law"), while acknowledging that "the authority to make decisions
is exclusively that of the client and, if made within the framework
of the law, such decisions are binding on the lawyer,' 1 76 notes that
"[i]n assisting his client to reach a proper decision, it is often desir-
able for the lawyer to point out those factors which may lead to a
decision that is morally just as well as legally permissible.' 77 Ca-
non 7 of the Model Code, in fact, provides attorneys with a way not
to engage in legally permissible action that is morally abhorrent to
the lawyer on a personal level.'78 The Model Code thus attempts to
integrate the lawyer's personal value system into the legal decision-
173. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.1.2(b) (1983).
174. The American Bar Association adopted the Model Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility in 1981 to acknowledge the obligation that attorneys have "to maintain
the highest standards of ethical conduct." MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY
pmbl. (1981).
175. See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY canon 7 (1981).
176. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-7 (1981).
177. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-8 (1981).
178. Ethical Consideration 7-9 of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility
provides that:
In the exercise of his professional judgment on those decisions which are for
his determination in the handling of a legal matter, a lawyer should always
act in a manner consistent with the best interests of his client. However,
when an action in the best interest of his client seems to be unjust, he may
ask his client for permission to forgo such action.
MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-9 (1981). See also MODEL CODE OF
PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-10 (1981) (recognizing that "[t]he duty of a lawyer to
represent his client with zeal does not militate against his concurrent obligation to
treat with consideration all persons involved in the legal process and to avoid the
infliction of needless harm").
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making process. The tension between the incorporation of per-
sonal beliefs on the part of the lawyer and the conception of the
lawyer as the executive agent of the client remains upon scrutiny of
the existing professional codes.
Whether a lawyer subscribes exclusively to the notion of client-
centered lawyering or, instead, includes her personal morality in
advising the client, "the public looks to the legal system for
truth."17 9 Lawyers, therefore, have an important duty to the public
in defining this truth and, as noted by legal ethics experts Richard
Zitrin and Carol M. Langford:
American lawyers in a wide variety of practices face competing
ethical principles-among the most important, the choice be-
tween representing a client's interests diligently and being truth-
ful in one's words and deeds .... Just as the rules of ethics are
based substantially on moral standards, each lawyer must ulti-
mately decide how to balance ethics with the moral principles of
our society: whether being "ethical" should be defined by what a
lawyer can "get away with"; whether a lawyer must remain loyal
to a client who insists on acting illegally; whether a lawyer is
willing to pay the practical and economic consequences of "do-
ing the right thing," even if it means losing a job; and whether,
and to what extent a personal sense of morality should play a
part in a lawyer's behavior.180
To satisfy this obligation-to define this truth and to determine
what is moral behavior in handling legal issues-for the public, and
for themselves, attorneys must learn to incorporate their ideas and
views on morality as part of their legal training.
III. COMBINING PERSONAL MORALITY WITH
LEGAL EDUCATION
In a society that views lawyers as selfish' 81 and in which the gen-
eral consensus among academics is that lawyers consciously sepa-
179. RICHARD ZITRIN & CAROL M. LANGFORD, THE MORAL COMPASS OF THE
AMERICAN LAWYER: TRUTH, POWER, JUSTICE, AND GREED 3 (1999).
180. Id. at 3-4.
181. Graham, supra note 150, at 8-9 (arguing that "law students need to be taught
how to reflect critically on ethical dilemmas from a practical perspective if they are to
develop the kind of 'excellence' in virtue necessary to recover the 'human side' of the
profession" and that clinical education "offers a rich opportunity for students to reest-
ablish and redefine the values of the profession"); see also ZITRIN & LANGFORD,
supra note 179,.at 3 ("Many consider the typical American Lawyer to be either im-
moral or amoral, while many others believe that our justice system no longer protects
the interests of the average person. Polls show that public confidence in lawyers has
never been lower.").
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rate law from morality,' 8 2 the benefit of moral education in law
school is practically self-evident.183 Recognition of one's own ethi-
cal beliefs leads to respect for the beliefs of others. If lawyers be-
gan to appreciate the personal beliefs of the parties opposing their
clients, they might act more ethically toward these parties, thereby
enriching the judicial system as a whole. Nevertheless, one cannot
fault an attorney, the product of Langdellian discourse, from doing
exactly what three years of training has taught him or her to do.
1 84
If law is an objective science, lawyering becomes a means of fitting
objectively evaluated experimental data into the laws of that sci-
ence, with no conception of subjective considerations.
Law is not a science. As one scholar notes, "law is the means to
an end, and is to be appraised only in the light of the ends it
achieves.' 85 In order for society and the legal profession to evalu-
ate the impact of law and lawyering, we must look to what the law
accomplishes. If justice and proper moral behavior are among
those goals, lawyers must be taught this duty of moral conduct
while still in law school. Individuals become lawyers and learn how
to behave in their professional role during law school.186
Legal training needs to prepare students for assuming this role.
The lawyer must be taught how to behave when the norms of his
societal role conflict with universal ethical principles.1 81 W. Brad-
182. Bennett, supra note 5, at 46.
183. In any event, law school may be the only institution available to teach moral
reasoning and ethics so they must do so, since attorneys will otherwise never learn the
intricacies of legal ethics. Hon. Tom C. Clark, Teaching Professional Ethics, 12 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 249, 252 (1975); see also Sidney P. Simpson, The Function of the Uni-
versity Law School, 49 HARV. L. REV. 1068, 1070 (1936) ("If the law is to remain.., a
profession, some means must be provided for instilling... that sense of obligation and
responsibility which is the essence of a profession.").
184. Graham, supra note 150, at 43-44 (1996).
The traditional Socratic method... focuses more on conflict, and less on "jus-
tice, fairness, and morality." Accordingly, it fosters a kind of "moral indif-
ference" to the resolution of legal disputes. The student learns about the
"able advocate" who can argue both sides of a controversy, but is never told
about the "responsive advisor" who, in rendering candid advice to a client,
considers the legal, moral, economic, social and political factors of the
situation.
Id. But see Russell G. Pearce, Teaching Ethics Seriously: Legal Ethics as the Most
Important Subject in Law School, 29 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 719 (1998).
185. M. McDougal, Fuller v. The American Legal Realists, 50 YALE L.J. 827, 834-35
(1941).
186. See, e.g., Wendel, supra note 109 (arguing that competing visions of the role of
the lawyer complicate the ethical conflicts faced by legal practitioners).
187. Id. at 163.
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ley Wendel, an associate at the Seattle law firm of Bogle & Gates,
contends:
A person's professional or social role may provide a justification
for what would otherwise be ethically impermissible conduct. A
moral norm that purports to apply universally may not actually
bind a person who is subject to a countervailing norm derived
from her station in society. In other words, when role-depen-
dent norms conflict with universal norms, role morality may
provide an excuse.' 88
Thus, law school must necessarily prepare law students to grapple
with the issues that may arise from ethical conflict situations in
which their duties as a lawyer contravene more macrocosmic ethi-
cal values. Just as the soldier is taught to kill enemy combatants in
times of war, transgressing the morally universal norm placing pri-
macy on life, the lawyer must be taught to work within and with
their societal role as a soothsayer of justice.
Instead of preparing law students for their role in society, legal
education, as it currently exists, an outgrowth of the Langdellian
method, may actually discourage Stage V and Stage VI moral rea-
soning by ignoring the tension between law and personal convic-
tion.' 89 The motivations for social change and the scrutiny of the
socio-legal order in these two stages result from the very question-
ing of laws and the legal system that law school training treats with
disdain. Without this examination, lawyers are agents of the sys-
tem and cannot perceive incentives to change the system, no mat-
ter what vision of lawyering they aspire to.
For example, in describing two commonly subscribed models of
professional conduct, the "hired gun" and "social engineer" mod-
els, Dean Roger Cramton of Cornell Law School notes the inher-
188. Id. Wendel further argues that "in order to justify actions against the claims of
universal morality, a professional must show both that the role is itself justified mor-
ally, and that the nature of the role trumps the particular universal ethical maxim that
would otherwise apply." Id. at 164-65.
189. Daicoff, supra note 10, at 1396; Elkins, supra note 145, at 528. Elkins notes
that
[t]he orchestration of the typical everyday class under the famed "Socratic
method" is nothing more than a barrier to understanding the human aspects
of the law ... From what I gather, thinking like a lawyer means we deal with
problems in a finely tuned, rational manner. Emotional reaction to
problems is unnecessary, unwanted, irrelevant, and unlawyerlike. How the
rules and principles apply to people is unimportant.
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ent contradiction between personal beliefs and values that law
students and attorneys wrestle with. 9 ' In particular, he says:
The role of the "hired gun" forces the potential lawyer to visual-
ize himself as an intellectual prostitute. In law school he is
asked to argue both sides of many issues. It is common for a
student to respond to the question "How do you come out on
this case?" with the revealing reply, "It depends on what side
I'm on." If the lawyer is going to live with himself, the system
seems to say, he can't worry too much about right and wrong.'91
The "hired gun" model thus encourages the mechanical application
of the existing legal order. An attorney who acts as a "hired gun"
holds the concept of zealous advocate to be of paramount impor-
tance and will act to further client interests, even if furthering those
interests comes at great personal cost for the client or involves
large societal costs. 192 The "hired gun" attorney carries out the
wishes of the client, with few, if any, concerns beyond achieving the
goals articulated by the client.1 93
Nor does the "social engineer" model provide greater guidance
for combining personal morality with the practice of law:
The "social engineer" model is cast on a larger scale, dealing
with issues and interests rather than with individuals, but this
role has a somewhat lifeless, bureaucratic and technocratic fla-
vor. There is also a moral tension between the instrumental
character of the role and democratic values. If the social engi-
neer provides the goals for his own effort, he contradicts the
values of democratic self-determination. On the other hand, if
he takes his values from the interests of the groups he repre-
sents, he suffers from the same subservience to values of others
that is characteristic of the hired gun.194
Hence, even the "social engineer," who at first glance may be con-
sidered a moral activist, is not without the value-free imprint of the
Langdellian method. The attorney who acts as a "social engineer"
190. Cramton, supra note 143, at 259-60.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. As described by Lord Henry Brougham,
[an advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in all the
world, and that person is his client. To save the client by all means and
expedients, and at all hazards and costs to other persons, and, among them,
to himself, is his first and only duty; and in performing this duty he must not
regard the alarm, the torments, the destruction which he may bring upon
others.
2 TRIAL OF QUEEN CAROLINE 8 (J. Nightingale ed. 1821).
194. Cramton, supra note 143, at 260.
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thus merely carries out the wishes of many clients, just as the
"hired gun" attorney acts in strict adherence with the directives of
a single client.' 95 Seemingly, no matter which one of these conven-
tional perceptions of lawyering a law student aspires to, he or she
faces the divergence between personal beliefs and the law. Law-
yers cannot think of the law as value free. Law students and attor-
neys must necessarily look into themselves for moral guidance
based on their personal principles of ethics.
Such inner reflection becomes increasingly difficult for individu-
als upon completion of legal training. Society places conflicting
and challenging demands on attorneys-"as advisor, facilitator,
and advocate; as zealous representative and manipulator; as self
and alter ego to the client."'19 6 As one scholar aptly put it, "[t]he
art of persuasion and its demands on lawyers as persons are the
core of the conflict many lawyers feel.' 1 97 The lawyer's personal
morality "is held separate, the stuff of idle office chatter, late-night
drinks with coworkers, or pillow talk. ' 198 This disjunction between
individual opinion and the lawyer's duty in his role begins in law
school. Psychological analysis of law students suggests that the de-
velopment of analytical skills and simultaneous disdain for the
emotional and social implications of decision-making that takes
place in law school produces high levels of emotional distress
among individuals in the legal profession. 199 Law students become
gradually more rational, at the cost of more human concerns and
emotions.
Law school smothers imagination and personal creativity."°
Learning the rules of substantive law, albeit a critical component of
the first year curriculum, leaves little time for creative dialogue.
195. Id.
196. Matasar, supra note 106, at 975 (describing the need for attorneys to acknowl-
edge and accept the conflicting demands placed on them by society).
197. Id.
198. Id. at 977.
199. G. Andrew H. Benjamin et al., The Role of Legal Education in Producing
Psychological Distress Among Law Students, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 225, 250.
But see Daicoff, supra note 10, at 1412 (arguing that "there is evidence that humanis-
tic, people-oriented individuals are the least satisfied lawyers"). Cf G. Andrew H.
Benjamin et al., The Prevalence of Depression, Alcohol Abuse, and Cocaine Abuse
Among United States Lawyers, 13 INT'L J. L. & PSYCH., 233, 240-41 (1990) (recogniz-
ing the extraordinarily high levels of substance abuse and mental illness among legal
practitioners as opposed to the general population); see also Stephen B. Shanfield &
G. Andrew H. Benjamin, Psychiatric Distress in Law Students, 35 J. LEGAL EDUC. 65,
69 (1985) (acknowledging that law students had higher rates of emotional distress
than either the general population or medical students).
200. E. Griswold, Intellect and Spirit, 81 HARV. L. REV. 292, 300-02 (1967).
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Rationality is exalted, while other societal values are met with
scorn. 2 1 In this temple of logic known as law school, and particu-
larly in the first year curriculum of substantive legal indoctrination,
law students must discard any creative, personally reflective habits
they may have had in exchange for the goddess of cognitive ration-
ality in order to succeed academically. Traditional conceptions of
the law become ends in and of themselves, with little room for per-
sonal and/or other perceptions of societal morality.
Moreover, the codification of legal professional responsibility
into ethical canons, rules of conduct, and conventions of profes-
sional responsibility may dissuade attorneys from reasoning using
universal ethical principles.2 °2 For example, in a greater societal
context, French sociologist Emile Durkheim, who studied methods
of morally educating children,20 3 critiqued the notion of the social
contract. He argued that individuals born into a social contract
generally have no role in the formation or amendation of that con-
tract.20 4 They merely enter an existing order. The social contract is
thus effectively an involuntary agreement to which the individual
has limited, if any, choice at all.20 5
By definition, most lawyers born into societies with legal systems
have little choice in formulating the laws or dramatically changing
them. Instead, they simply learn the laws and the categories within
which legal problems fall.20 6 In practice, attorneys apply this ability
to recognize issues involving the law and sorting them into the
groupings, perhaps with limited manipulation of the categories.
The attorneys and society at large glorify this ability as analytical
thinking and laud the high level of intelligence believed to be nec-
essary to this classification process.
The formalistic method by which law schools educate law stu-
dents stresses such categorical thinking.20 7 The use of codes outlin-
201. Id.
202. Steven R. Salbu, Law and Conformity, Ethics and Conflict: The Trouble with
Law-Based Conceptions of Ethics, 68 IND. L.J. 101, 106 (1992); see also Bruce Jen-
nings, The Regulation of Virtue: Cross-Currents in Professional Ethics, 10 J. Bus. ETH-
ICs 561, 567 (1991) (proposing the injection of moral dialogue into the evolution of
codes of professional ethics).
203. REIMER ET AL., supra note 29, at 39.
204. EMILE DURKHEIM, ON MORALITY AND SOCIETY: SELECTED WRITINGS 88
(Robert N. Bellah ed., 1973).
205. Id.
206. Cramton, supra note 143, at 255 ("Most law school teaching places the law
student in the position of an advocate who is asked to work with existing rules and
arguments. The goals underlying the competing rules are adverted to in passing, but
are evaluated only rarely.").
207. Quigley, supra note 145, at 39.
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ing the duties of legal ethics merely complements this categorical
perception of legal situations and enables lawyers to avoid the
stimulation of moral thought necessary for ethical decision-mak-
ing.2 °8 In fact, "conformity to established ethical guidelines is not
simply a function of degree of training or understanding of the
codes. '20 9 As an amalgamation of imprecise guidelines with little
situational specificity, ethical codes leave much to individual deter-
minations of morality.210 Lawyers thus need the skills to work with
these rules and utilitarian principles instead of around them.2 1'
Without personal reflection and ethical challenges in law school,
law students do not have the opportunity to face the moral dilem-
mas critical to moral development. 12 In Piagetian terms, without
the tension created by conflict between personal perceptions and
cognitive processes, moral development cannot occur.
Moreover, one of the most important skills legal educators instill
in law students is the skillful manipulation of bodies of rules to
achieve personally desirable results.21 3 In his critique of legal edu-
cation, Dean Erwin Griswold of Harvard Law School described the
208. Jonathan M. Freiman, Steps Toward a Pedagogy of Improvisation in Legal Eth-
ics, 31 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1279, 1285-86 (1998) (remarking that current ethics
teaching methods in law school causes the student to manipulate "the ethical code as
she would manipulate the law; she does not ruminate on it as she would ruminate on a
moral decision").
209. Todd S. Smith et al., Clinical Ethical Decision Making: An Investigation of the
Rationales Used to Justify Doing Less Than One Believes One Should, 22 EDUCA-
TIONAL PSYCHOLOGY: RESEARCH AND PRACTICE (1990) (analyzing an empirical
study suggesting that, despite the fact that individuals consider "what should be done
in ethical conflict situations in line with existing ethical guidelines ... [they] are more
likely to respond to personal values and practical considerations in determining what
they actually would do if faced with the situation").
210. Id. at 236 (acknowledging the mutability of professional ethical standards and
the rare mention of specific ethical conflict situations in ethical codes).
211. Cramton, supra note 143, at 249 ("Because law students and lawyers are con-
stantly tempted to invest generalizations with reality and to assume that law is more
preexisting, certain and stable than it really is, the foremost task of legal education is
to inculcate a skeptical attitude towards generalizations, principles, concepts and
rules.").
212. REIMER ET AL., supra note 29, at 40-42.
213. Professor Paula A. Franzese of Seton Hall University School of Law points
out:
We are living in a time when soul is being drained from the very social insti-
tutions that are supposed to be preserving life and values. We see signs of
this drain in language that has become manipulative and empty, in the ane-
mic condition of ethics and morality, and in the hunger for real pleasure and
meaningful lives that even affluent and successful people confess to.
Franzese, supra note 136, at 11 (quoting Thomas Moore, Forward to BENJAMIN SELLS:
THE SOUL OF THE LAW 9 (1994)).
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"premium on verbal manipulation." '214 Such verbal manipulation,
especially if no personal moral convictions guide behavior, leaves
attorneys with the ability and desire to maneuver the rules of pro-
fessional ethics for maximum personal benefit. In effect, ethical
guidelines become another set of rules for lawyers to manipulate
through categorical thinking. Thus, when bar associations present
practicing attorneys with ethics rules, the lawyers may easily cir-
cumvent the objectives behind these ethical regulations,215 just as
law school trains them to do with the rules of evidence, the rules of
procedure, and other statutory and regulatory laws. Current legal
ethics codes, dividing dilemmas into distinct categories, do not nec-
essarily promote morality among lawyers, who are trained in law
school to use the law by manipulating the categories to achieve
desired results.21 6 Instead, ethical guidelines present practicing at-
torneys with a way to feel morally superior without taking moral
responsibility.
IV. THE VIABILITY OF MORAL EDUCATION FOR LAWYERS
Neither professional ethics codes for legal professionals nor law
school teaching techniques promote moral growth in lawyers or
law students. Current methods of incorporating moral convictions
into the legal classroom generally involve courses on professional
responsibility.217 These courses vary in teaching style and empha-
sis.218 Some legal ethics classes emphasize an experiential method
of teaching in a clinical or other client-centered setting. Others are
simple tutorials on the pertinent rules of professional conduct for
the state bar exam.219 No matter the approach, the manner in
which law schools currently teach legal ethics does not seem to
214. Griswold, supra note 200, at 299.
215. "[S]ome of the students may use what they learn from [studying cases and bar
opinions] to go just short of the line of impropriety and say, 'Well, now I have learned
how to outmaneuver my Bar Association disciplinary committee."' Robert E. Ma-
thews, The Legal Profession Course, 41 U. COLO. L. REV. 379, 381 (1969).
216. See ZITRIN & LANGFORD, supra note 179, at 3 ("There is a palpable tension
between the rules of legal ethics and other important principles of our society: telling
the truth, being fair and compassionate, seeking justice, being courageous, acting as a
moral human being.").
217. Lerman, supra note 103, at 457-64 (1998). At the W.M. Keck Foundation Fo-
rum on the Teaching of Legal Ethics in 1997, professional responsibility educators
gathered to set goals and discuss the status of and prognosis for ethics education in
law schools. Id.
218. Id. (noting that most legal ethics professionals seem to agree that ethical edu-
cation through clinical experience may be the best way to inculcate moral reflection
and the routine examination of personal values in lawyering).
219. Id.
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have a significant effect on the moral development of law
students.220
Professional responsibility courses do, however, share a common
goal: they support consistent and morally-directed action on the
part of all attorneys in giving advice and being advocates.221 As
described by Professor Thomas Schaffer of Notre Dame Law
School, ethics courses aspire to have students begin to ask the fol-
lowing questions:
What is a worthy human life? Is there some kind of dissonant
enterprise where we talk about living like a lawyer? That has to
be a subsidiary question, because if you can't be a lawyer and
live as a worthy person, then you should not be a lawyer. Which
has priority, conscience or the rules? If it is the rules, the ques-
tion is: are you clever enough to stay out of trouble? Are there
enough common values that you can conduct the first
enterprise? 222
Classes on legal ethics thus involve historic rhetorical questions
on the perpetual discord between societal goals and individual
freedoms and beliefs. Despite the noble aspirations of professional
responsibility seminars, they remain difficult to teach. Former
Chief Justice Warren E. Burger observed that law schools deem-
phasized professional ethics by making professional responsibility
courses one credit classes and by separating legal ethics into a sin-
gle class, isolated from any real discussion of the practice of law.223
Just as law schools distinctively classify the traditional areas of sub-
stantive law separately, they pigeonhole ethical thinking in law, a
critical component of all areas of lawyering, into its own
compartment.224
220. Moliterno, supra note 146, at 96.
221. One of the least discussed, but most effective, ways in which legal educators
teach ethics is by example. See Cramton, supra note 143, at 253 (describing the "hid-
den curriculum" ethically educating law students as being comprised of "the example
of teachers and administrators in the handling of issues and people; the implication by
students that matters not included in the formal curriculum are unimportant to law-
yers; and the powerfulness of the student culture in affecting attitudes toward grading,
examinations, competition, status and 'success'").
222. Lerman, supra note 103, at 464-65 (1998) (quoting Professor Thomas
Schaffer).
223. Hon. Warren E. Burger, The Role of the Law School in the Teaching of Legal
Ethics and Professional Responsibility, 29 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 377, 391-93 (1980).
224. See generally Freiman, supra note 208. Freiman argues that, whether the pur-
pose of teaching legal ethics is to explain ethical doctrine or to teach law students how
to behave ethically, traditional legal teaching methods are unsuccessful in the realm of
legal ethics. Id.
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In conjunction with this peculiar method of classification, anec-
dotal evidence supports the notion that students and even mem-
bers of law school faculties scorn legal ethics courses and consider
legal ethics to be useless and a waste of time.225 Law students tend
to view these classes as detracting from valuable time that might be
better spent on learning more legal principles. Likewise, law
school faculties tend to treat professional ethics less seriously be-
cause the impact of these classes is harder to quantify.226 This dis-
dainful attitude toward legal ethics professionals and classes227
would change if law schools incorporated professional accountabil-
ity into all facets of legal education, including the teaching of sub-
stantive law.
Although critics of moral education in law school contend that,
by the time an individual enters law school, his or her values are
immutable,22 s empirical studies in moral psychology suggest that
individuals in their twenties and thirties have a greater capacity to
improve their moral reasoning than younger students. 229 Even as-
suming, arguendo, that entering law students have delineated val-
225. David Luban & Michael Millemann, Good Judgment: Ethics Teaching in Dark
Times, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 31, 37-38 (1995). Luban and Milleman analyzed an-
ecdotal data to demonstrate that students despise classes on professional responsibil-
ity and that the faculty at large do not deem legal ethics educators to be "real" legal
professors. Id. at 37-39; Rosemary C. Harold, Dilemmas: Ethics Are Lawyers' Biggest
Concern-So Why Isn't There Any Rational Way to Teach Them in Law School?, STU.
DENT LAW., Dec. 1989, at 9 (noting that students treat ethics classes as a joke and
waste of time). But see David F. Cavers, Signs of Progress: Legal Education, 33 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 33, 39 (1983) (outlining the results of a 1980 survey demonstrating that
students considered ethics classes to be as important as other classes).
226. Luban & Millemann, supra note 225, at 37-38.
227. "It is a standard bit of student conventional wisdom that professional ethics
classes are a joke. For many people, at best it's a blowoff course, one that can be
skipped often and without guilt." Harold, supra note 225, at 9.
228. Noted jurist Oliver Wendell Holmes remarked, "We learn how to behave as
lawyers, soldiers, merchants, or what not by being them. Life, not the parson, teaches
conduct." Richard A. Posner, The Deprofessionalization of Legal Teaching and Schol-
arship, 91 MIcH. L. REV. 1921, 1924 (1993) (quoting a letter from Oliver Wendell
Holmes to Frederick Pollock (Apr. 2, 1926), in 2 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS: THE
CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK 1874-
1932, at 178 (Mark D. Howe ed., 1941)); Katharine T. Bartlett, Teaching Values: A
Dilemma, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 519, 520 (1987). Although Bartlett admits that values
are generally formed by the time individuals begin law school, she emphasizes that
legal educators have "some responsibility for our students' reflection about their own
professional definition and values, about 'who they are what should be their future.'"
Id. at 519 (quoting Roger C. Cramton, Beyond the Ordinary Religion, 37 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 509 (1987)).
229. REIMER ET AL., supra note 29; James S. Leming, Curricular Effectiveness in
Moral Values Education: A Review of Research, 10 J. MORAL EDUC. 147 (1981); cf.
Posner, supra note 228, at 1924 ("As for the task of instilling legal ethics in law stu-
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ues, the teaching of legal ethics can and will impact how these
personal values factor into the professional role of attorney.23°
Law schools can, at the very least, teach students how to confront
their own values when legal dilemmas arise in the context of their
professional role. 31 In addition, as Professor Elliott M. Abram-
som of DePaul University School of Law has noted, law professors
can teach students that:
[Tiheir ethical responsibilities extend to wider dimensions than
their own and their clients' selfishly narrow materialistic inter-
ests .... [S]tudents can be infused with some modest sense that
their work has social and collective impact as well as personal
and individual impacts and that, accordingly, they must look
outward, and comprehensively, as well as inwardly to the per-
sonal selfish nucleus of that work.232
Only if legal education recognizes that lawyering includes an ac-
knowledgement of personal beliefs, even if this reflection is simply
cursory, will lawyers be more human.
Being a lawyer does not mean being value-neutral.233 An attor-
ney can consider each and every legal problem in value-driven
terms. In fact, lawyering often involves reconciling clients' values
that may differ from the beliefs of others or conventional societal
values. Law schools must acknowledge the interplay of values and
dents at elite, or for that matter at any, law schools, I can think of few things more
futile than attempting to teach people to be good.").
230. See Moliterno, supra note 146, at 95; see also Elliott M. Abramson, Puncturing
the Myth of the Moral Intractibility of Law Students: The Suggestiveness of the Work of
Psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg for Ethical Training in Legal Education, 7 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 223 (1993) (arguing that, based on the work of
Lawrence Kohlberg, legal education fails to fulfill its responsibility of training law
students in morality on the fallacious premise that law students are too old to improve
their moral reasoning skills).
231. Phyllis Goldfarb, A Theory-Practice Spiral: The Ethics of Feminism and
Clinical Education, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1599, 1662 (1991) (stating that law school should
encourage students "to examine their personal values and the relationship of these
values to their professional role, which, in turn, compels students to evaluate their
professional responsibility"). See also Roger C. Cramton, Beyond the Ordinary Relig-
ion, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 509, 511 (1987) (describing the broader responsibility legal
educators have to inculcate their students with a sense of public duty); Graham, supra
note 150, at 30. But see Cramton, supra note 143, at 250. Cramton notes:
[S]ince the lawyer is engaged in the implementation of the values of others-
a client or a government agency or the general society-he need not be con-
cerned directly with value questions. His primary task is that of the crafts-
man or skilled technician who can work out the means by which the client or
the society can achieve its goals.
Id.
232. Abramson, supra note 230, at 248.
233. Bartlett, supra note 228, at 520; Graham, supra note 150, at 29.
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the law and incorporate the discussion of values in the context of
lawyering, even if they consider increased moral development to
be an unattainable goal. As Professor Deborah L. Rhode of Stan-
ford University School of Law notes
[pirofessional schools should require instruction in ethics for the
same reason that they require courses in other areas; the subject
is central to effective practice and not all students will elect it.
Historical experience demonstrates that a laissez-faire approach
is particularly inadequate when it comes to ethics . . . Many
practicing lawyers will never encounter a shifting (or springing)
executory interest; virtually all will confront issues of honesty,
confidentiality, and loyalty. 234
The ethical lessons taught and examples set by legal educators may
be among the most useful learning law students accomplish while
in law school.
Admittedly, the limited teaching time available to legal educa-
tors makes the incorporation of moral discourse into the discussion
of substantive law challenging. Understandably, legal educators al-
ready have a heavy burden in teaching both the substance of the
law and the relationship between law and society. Nevertheless,
the importance of moral development, particularly in the legal
community, justifies the inclusion of some moral dialogue in each
and every law school class and throughout each year of law
school.235 Such a fusion is certainly possible. The University of
California at Berkley has developed such a fusion with a first year
curriculum incorporating ethics education 236 and Harvard Law
School has implemented an interdisciplinary approach to teaching
ethics.2 37 These innovations portend much for the future of legal
ethics in law schools.
Models for pervasive ethics teaching and anecdotal analyses in a
clinical legal education setting indicate that students will emerge
from law school with a better sense of professional accountability
when education results from the combination of moral dialogue
234. Rhode, supra note 6, at 43.
235. Throughout much of world history, the teaching of moral analysis was a critical
part of the educational curriculum. Rhode, supra note 6, at 33-34. From the ancient
Greek academies to medieval universities, to the early colleges and universities in the
fledgling United States, the shaping and development of moral character was a sub-
stantial concern of educators. Id.
236. Stephen Bundy, Ethics Education in the First Year: An Experiment, 58 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 19 (1995).
237. David B. Wilkins, Redefining the "Professional" in Professional Ethics: An In-
terdisciplinary Approach to Teaching Professionalism, 58 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS.
241, 247-57 (1995).
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and legal training.238 Ethical issues permeate every area of sub-
stantive law and provide a normative arena in which the legal edu-
cator may demonstrate the critical role ethics plays in legal
analysis. 239 Teaching techniques that foster the interplay between
morality and the law are critical to the development of professional
ethics because they enable law students to observe and practice
ethical behavior in a legal context without any disastrous implica-
tions for clients and society at large. 240
If law schools engaged their students in moral conversation
throughout law school, fledgling attorneys would feel closer to
their clients and see themselves as more accountable to society.
Most importantly, it might make lawyers happier with them-
selves.2 4' The constant struggle to resolve personal beliefs with cat-
egorical, formalistic legal training would naturally be emotionally
draining. Law and morality, however, can coexist. The inclusion of
the law into one's mind does not necessarily preclude the consider-
ation of one's personal values.242 In fact, the environment of legal
training must necessarily include moral introspection to foster ethi-
cal thinking, because societal reasoning derives from a communal
sense of values.243 In addition, by encouraging students to reason
238. Rhode, supra note 6, at 32 (arguing that law schools need to adopt a compre-
hensive approach to professional responsibility that includes separate coverage of le-
gal ethics as well as the pervasive teaching of legal ethics); Franzese, supra note 136,
at 19; Graham, supra note 150, at 35-41; Robert P. Burns, Teaching the Basic Ethics
Class Through Simulation: The Northwestern Program in Advocacy and Professional-
ism, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS 37 (1995).
239. Rhode, supra note 6, at 50-51.
240. Id.
241. Laurie A. Morin, Reflections on Teaching Law as Right Livelihood: Cultivating
Ethics, Professionalism, and Commitment to Public Service from the Inside Out, 35
TULSA L.J. 227, 254-55 (2000).
242. Freiman, supra note 208, at 1285 (recognizing that "[w]ithin time, the particu-
lar ethical conundrums of the profession are not seen through the prism of the per-
sonal moral system previously developed, but through the prism of a set of legal
requirements: the Code, malpractice doctrine, etc.").
243. Matthew Lipman, Ethical Reasoning and the Craft of Moral Practice, 16 J.
Moral Educ. 139, 141 (1987). Lipman notes that:
[T]he reason of the child is helpless in the absence of conditions which nur-
ture reflection and are in turn hospitable to it. If the school, the family, the
teacher and the curriculum do not foster thinking and do not welcome it
when it occurs, the likelihood that the child will be able to engage in ethical
reasoning is fairly remote. It is of equal importance that children learn to
reason together with their peers, for the only way to deal effectively with
peer pressure is not to engage in futile efforts to eliminate it, but to endeavor
to make it rational, and this can be done by converting the classroom into a
reasoning community.
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with their peers, educators can effectively harness peer pressure to
encourage the development of moral reasoning skills.244 Currently,
law school fails to combine moral conviction with legal training. 245
Reflecting on his experience as a legal educator, one scholar
comments:
Incorporating right livelihood into the curriculum would require
a paradigm shift in the way we think and deliver legal education.
The traditional model of law school teaching, with its emphasis
on the Langdellian method, rigorous categorical thinking, and
competitive adversarial process, may accomplish some impor-
tant pedagogical goals, but it leaves many casualties in its
wake. , 246
As so skillfully demonstrated in this personal reflection, traditional
legal discourse lauds the separation of values and beliefs from ob-
jective, conclusory determinations of law.247 To prevent such sepa-
ration, and rather an amalgamation of morality and the law, legal
educators can look to the teachings of Piaget and Kohlberg.
The inherent tension found between legal and personal convic-
tions can actually serve as a moral tool2 48 in a manner similar to
that employed by Moshe Blatt in applying Kohlberg's cognitive-
developmental theory of moralization 249 and Piaget's work on the
evolution of morality through cognitive processes.25 ° Instead of ig-
noring personal values in the legal context or viewing these beliefs
as a liability, the law should embrace personal morality as a way to
enhance the law and the application of legal precepts. In terms of
legal training, educators should strive to push their students to
244. Id.
245. See generally Franzese, supra note 136, at 18 (reflecting on the lack of develop-
ment in moral reasoning present in traditional legal education).
246. Morin, supra note 241, at 233.
247. Id. at 255. Morin suggests the creation of a "community of truth," in which
"'objects' of knowledge and ultimate authorities are replaced by a community of
learners gathered around a common 'subject' and guided by shared rules of observa-
tion and interpretation." Id.; see also PARKER J. PALMER, THE COURAGE TO TEACH:
EXPLORING THE INNER LANDSCAPE OF A TEACHER'S LIFE 2 (1998) (describing a
teaching model that centers on the student and not the teachers' knowledge as the
basis for learning).
248. Eleanor W. Myers, "Simple Truths" About Moral Education, 45 AM. U. L.
REV. 823, 826 (1996) (suggesting that the legal profession would be better served if
law schools trained students to incorporate moral intuitions in resolving ethical
dilemmas).
249. See Part I.
250. See Part I; see Morin, supra note 241, at 233. Morin, although not relying on
Piaget's theory of morality shifts arising from traditional cognitive growth, argues that
the conflicts between personal values and the law would prevent alienation and en-
courage social accountability in law students. Id.
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higher stages of moral judgment in order to encourage advanced
reasoning on the basis of ethical principles and personal reflection,
as opposed to more selfish, ego-based drives or the mere mainte-
nance of the current socio-legal order.
Some teaching techniques embrace the dichotomy between the
socio-legal order and individual morality in such an educational
fashion.251 Adult learning theorist Jack Mezirow applied the
groundwork of Piaget's description of the accommodation learning
model in proposing that experience becomes educational when the
experience involves a "disorienting moment.2 z5 2 He describes a
disorienting moment to be a cognitive exposure that defies the
learner's perception and analysis of his surrounding environment
and the events that transpire therein.2 5 3 Such a disorienting mo-
ment then, according to Mezirow, may precipitate a reflection and
exploration of the experience such that the individual must reori-
ent himself.254 In this manner, when personal views conflict with
objective legal reality,255 the lawyer will morally grow if he must
reconcile this reality and the motivations with his or her personal
views. If such reconciliation does not occur, the lawyer will be mo-
tivated to transform the socio-legal order in conjunction with his
personal values, whatever they may be. In any event, the tension
between personal and legal morality will be recognized and ex-
plored by the attorney.
Although adult learning techniques based on the experiential ac-
commodation concept have been proposed with regard to clinical
251. Wendel, supra note 109, at 179 (recognizing that "legal education does not
incline law students to question the foundation of the norms of their profession").
252. See generally JACK MEZIROW ET AL., FOSTERING CRITICAL REFLECTION IN
ADULTHOOD: A GUIDE TO TRANSFORMATIVE AND EMANCIPATORY LEARNING
(1990).
253. Id. at 168; see also PAULO FRIERE, PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED 80-81
(1970) (suggesting that constant evaluation of cognitive processes is critical to the
continued well-being of individuals and society).
254. MEZIROW ET AL., supra note 252, at 168.
255. Professor Richard A. Matasar notes:
Lawyers, masters of manipulation, take on a role that potentially alienates
their moral judgments from their actions on behalf of clients. But lawyers
are not merely professionals, they are people who belong to religious organi-
zations, study moral philosophers, read popular texts on justice, and have
complicated sets of beliefs about what is right and what is wrong. And
whether their beliefs spring from complex and unbending external standards
or from less definite or flexible idiosyncratic feelings, lawyers cannot escape
from themselves.
Matasar, supra note 106, at 975.
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legal education,256 Piaget's accommodation model in the context of
Kohlberg's cognitive development theory and Blatt's moral educa-
tion method has significance for legal education in general. Lawy-
ering, from the attorney's perspective, ultimately is about
relationships-relationships between lawyers, between lawyers and
society, and, most significantly, between lawyer and client. Legal
ethics forms the crux of this last relationship.257 In fact, profes-
sional accountability is, in effect, synonymous with how the attor-
ney conducts himself in all of his or her relationships. Given the
magnitude and frequency of these relationships, the lawyer who
remains unable to reconcile his personal values with that of the
socio-legal order finds herself in a rather difficult situation.
CONCLUSION
Professor Richard A. Matasar describes the continuous battle in
which attorneys find themselves. He describes the lawyer's fate as
the need "to argue simultaneously the correctness of matters he or
she subjectively believes to be incorrect. Doing so for oneself con-
jures up images of split personalities and fundamental contradic-
tions. ' '258 This mental separation is not necessary and, in fact, may
be counter-productive, not only to the attorney, but to society at
large. When attorneys forego moral considerations for the mere
continuance of the existing social order, they do not achieve any
potential they may have for Stage V morality in the cognitive de-
velopmental model of moralization engendered by Kohlberg.
256. Quigley, supra note 145, at 37. Quigley proposes that clinical legal educators
apply adult learning techniques "to seize" the disorienting moments available in
clinical legal education to teach social justice. Id. at 38.
257. Moliterno, supra note 146, at 98 ("Although the law student can learn the
substantive law of contracts quite well without entering into a contract, the student
cannot appreciate the experiential aspects of the law that is formed by data from the
lawyer's various relationships without experience in those relationships.") Moliterno
theorizes that legal educators must expose their students to the relationships that
form the substance of the legal profession. Id. He defines those relationships to be
that between lawyer-client, lawyer-justice system, lawyer-adverse lawyer, lawyer-wit-
ness, lawyer-juror, subordinate lawyer-supervisory lawyer, lawyer-society. Id. at 100.
Each of these interactions involves a different set of norms, but all center on one
question, "who am I as a lawyer and as a person?" Id. at 101. According to
Moliterno, traditional law school classroom teaching does not teach law students how
to conduct themselves appropriately in these relationships and comport to the most
socially responsible behavior, while not compromising personal values. Id. In particu-
lar, Moliterno contends that having a professional responsibility course is not the
most efficacious manner in which to teach ethics, although this method is most com-
monly adopted by law schools in light of its similarity to other learning theories gener-
ally found in the legal classroom. Id. at 105.
258. Matasar, supra note 106, at 976.
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Such Stage V reasoning forms the basis for social change. In
order for attorneys to fulfill professionalism's promise, law school
needs to promote, not discourage, higher levels of moral ability.
As articulately stated by Professor Paula Franzese of Seton Hall
University School of Law:
There is no such thing as living a neutral life. As attorneys each
of us is powerful, no matter what we may have been told or may
have felt to the contrary. Let us proceed, then, to define our
calling carefully as well as mightily .... As we chart our course,
it will be up to us to ask, "Does this path have a heart?" Let us
hope that we will always have the wisdom to choose that road.
Our doing so will transform for the better the shape of this
world, far more than any courtroom or boardroom victory ever
could.259
259. Franzese, supra note 136, at 18 (emphasis omitted).
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